The last thing
this author wants to do is detract or diminish from the extended and in-depth
research that has been conducted by the members of the Association of RAF
Fighter Control Officers. But I would like to acknowledge their efforts, and
provide increased visibility to military historians, and others who may be interested, in
one of the most obscure and unrecognized pair of units which fought and died
during the Battle of Arnhem. I would further like to express gratitude for the
use of their materials, with the hope that this extended exposure will in some
small way expand the recognition these gallant men so richly deserve. In addition the advanced level of technology, and the technical skills involved, are intriguing for this period in history. Remember at the time we are still talking vacuum tubes (aka valves) as an essential component of electronics, and the cavity magnetron was the critical fundamental element of early radar systems.
I have
personally studied the battle for over five decades, and have amassed an
extensive library including not only reference books, but copies of original
source documentation including operational orders, cargo lists, and
after-action reports. None of this information made mention of the units. It was
not until last year that I came across a briefing paper on the units, and the
role they played in the battle. The units are even more obscure than the ”Phantom”
unit which operated during the battle.
Their official
RAF designation was No. 6080 LWU (Light Warning Unit) and No. 6341 LWU. In the
beginning of September 1944 they were
transferred from No. 60 Group RAF to No. 38 Group RAF, with specific attachment
to Headquarters, First Allied Airborne Corps. Their primary mission was to
provide forward ground-based control of close tactical air support of RAF
fighter and fighter bomber assets to the airborne troops once on the ground.
Truly the first forward tactical air controllers
Quoting from an
excerpt of “The Arnhem Fighter Control
Story”:
“The radar
equipment selected for the operation was once again the Type 6 radar system. This
highly mobile equipment could be housed in a tent or a van sized vehicle. It
had a maximum range of 50 miles and was equipped with a range height display
and a Plan Position Indicator (PPI) display that meant that it could be used to
control fighter aircraft. It had been produced for two main purposes; first, to
provide radar cover rapidly in situations where it was not possible to deploy
the larger mobile long-range systems and, secondly, to provide low-level
forward coverage for larger mobile radar units. Number 60 Group put in place a
rapid programme of training and two Light Warning Units (LWU) designated
Numbers 6341 and 6080 were formed under the command of Squadron Leaders Wheeler
and Coxon respectively. Wing Commander Laurance Brown MBE was appointed as the
force commander. Wing Commander Brown was a highly experienced radar officer
and controller who had been in the thick of the action during the blitz as a
GCI controller and took part in every major amphibious operation in the war
including landing on Gold Beach on D day; he was mentioned in despatches three
times."
Having been
successfully employed at D-day, there was severe disappointment when at a
meeting at Bentley Priory on 15 September 1944 they were advised by a “representative”
(not further identified) of the First Allied Airborne Army that their services,
providing transportable ground based radar, would not be required for the
operation. Fortunately Wing Commander Brown was able to have a meeting with LtGen Frederick "Boy"
Browning, OC 1st Allied Airborne Army the
next day, 16 September, and in one of his sounder moments Browning reversed the
decision. Although the precise timing is not known to this author, at some point intelligence was gained that the Luftwaffe had stationed Junkers Ju88C-6 "Owl" night fighters in the immediate Arnhem area (probably at Deelen airfield, north of Arnhem), certainly contributing to that decision.
Within an
unbelievable short span of time unit personnel were able to modify and prepare
their equipment as payloads distributed in four Airspeed AS51 Horsa gliders. Each
unit was split into two loads which can be broadly categorized as the receiver
and display equipment in one load and the transmitter and aerial in the other
load; unit personnel were split between their two gliders.
In all fairness Appendix
9 of the definitive book Glider Pilots at
Arnhem is the Air Load Manifest Operation MARKET- Second Lift. It lists
No.s 6341 and 6080 Light Warning Units, RAF in Horsa Chalk No. 5000-5003 (four
gliders), and shows gliders 5000 and 5003 aborted. To the best of this author's knowledge this is the only mention in any book of the existence of the unit and the fate of the gliders carrying their equipment.
Continuing from
the “The Arnhem Fighter Control Story”:
“The first lift
from Harwell on the 17th went well with 25 (Editorial note: actually 38) gliders assigned to
transport the First Airborne Corps headquarters and Wing Commander Brown was on
this lift. Brown's glider landed safely but he had apparently forgotten his
sleeping bag and decided to retrieve it. On his way to do this the DZ was
strafed by an Me 109 and Brown was hit. He died of his wounds on the 18th
September and is buried in the Groesbeek Canadian War Cemetery. Brown was
arguably the most successful interception controller of the war.
As dawn broke on
the 18th at RAF Harwell the airfield was covered in thick fog and
nothing could move until late morning. Numbers 6080 and 6341 LWUs with a total
of five officers including a USAAC 1st Lieutenant from the 9th Army
Air Corps and 19 other ranks were to be carried in four Horsha gliders chalk
marked 5000 to 5003. With sufficient visibility by 1200 hours the lift started
and first combination airborne was chalk 5001 with Staff Sergeant John Kennedy
as first pilot and Sergeant 'Wag' Watson as co-pilot. The 'tug' was a Stirling
of Number 570 Squadron flown by Flying Officer Spafford RCAF. The formation
join up was complicated and Spafford's combination being the first to take off
had to fly straight ahead to allow other combinations from Harwell to formate.
The Harwell formation then flew to a main rendezvous at which they joined the
main attack force. The main formation comprised three streams of aircraft and
gliders on the left of the formation and slightly lower flew combinations of
Halifaxes towing Horsas, Halifaxes towing Hamilcars and some Dakotas not
towing. To the right there were numerous Dakotas towing Wacos some of them
actually towing two Waco gliders. In the centre stream in which the LWUs were
flying there were Halifaxes towing Hamilcars and Stirlings towing Horsas. It
was a truly impressive sight.
The Horsa chalk
mark 5000 with Staff Sergeant 'Lofty' Cummins as pilot and Sgt McInnes as
co-pilot was carrying personnel and half the equipment of 6080 LWU and took off
at 1208 hours; as it approached the turning point at 's-Hertogenbosch for the
approach to the LZ the combination experienced heavy Anti-Aircract (Ack Ack)
fire. The towing aircraft, which was a Stirling LK121 of 570 Squadron and
piloted by Flt Sergeant Culling, was hit. Culling advised Cummins that they
would have to slow down but shortly thereafter the Stirling reared up and spun
into the ground from 3000 feet killing all on board. Cummins showing great
presence of mind managed to cut the towline and landed heavily near the village
of Hemmen some seven miles from the LZ and the wrong side of the Neder Rijn
river. It was a quiet area and they were quickly surrounded by Dutch patriots
all speaking good English who told them they were in German occupied territory.
The radar equipment was destroyed by gunfire. The glider pilots and 6080 LWU
personnel then headed on foot for Divisional HQ led by a Dutchman on a bicycle.
All but Cummins crossed the Rhine by the Friel-Hevesdorp ferry and reached
Oosterbeek. Although it is not clear why Cummins tried to cross the Nijmegen
Bridge - the glider landed north of the river Waal - he was shot dead by a
sniper in attempting to do so.
Loaded into the
Horsa chalk number 5001 were personnel from 6341 LWU and half the radar
equipment. Known to be on board were Flight Lieutenant Richardson and six other
ranks; it is also believed that Squadron Leader Wheeler, OC 6341 LWU, may have
been on board although he does not seem to have taken part in the command
decisions that followed the landing but he was certainly not aboard the other
6341 LWU glider as will be seen later.
Glider 5001 also
experienced heavy ack-ack fire but Staff Sergeant Kennedy was released at the
right point and after pulling off to port in a climbing turn made a good
approach under machine gun fire and managed to land the glider as briefed
running up to the hedge on the LZ.
A dangerous
situation had developed to the southern end of LZ-X where a strong German force
infiltrated between two of the Border Regiment companies defending the LZ and
was able to direct machine gun and other fire at landing gliders.
Horsa glider
5002 piloted by Staff Sergeant 'Teddy' Edwards with Sergeant Ferguson as his
co-pilot was carrying personnel and equipment of 6080 LWU and was towed by a
Stirling from 295 Squadron. The combination reached the cast off point without
damage but during the approach to their designated landing spot 5002 was
subjected to the same heavy machine gun fire experienced by 5001 and was set on
fire before it landed. Edwards warned everybody on board to disembark as
quickly as possible on landing and 'hit the deck'. The only immediate cover on
landing was a field of Brussels Sprouts which the men made good use of. Even
so, the co-pilot Sergeant Bill 'Fergie' Ferguson was wounded when a bullet
travelled the length of his spine opening the flesh but fortunately not
seriously damaging the bone. The glider and its load were completely destroyed
by fire.
By this time
there was still no sign of either Horsas 5000 or 5003 on the LZ both of which
were carrying identical loads. By deduction it would appear that both were
carrying receiver and display equipment; this assumption is based upon the fact
that there is a Type 6 transmitter antenna on display at the Oosterbeek
Airborne Museum that most probably came from Horsa 5002. It would appear that
Flight Lieutenant Richardson - recorded as the senior RAF officer present -
decided that it would be impossible to field a serviceable radar and so he
decided to destroy the equipment on Horsa 5001 which was accomplished by Sten
gun fire and explosives.
Horsa 5003
piloted by Staff Sergeant Harris with Sergeant Bosley as his co-pilot was being
towed by a Stirling from 295 Squadron piloted by Flight Lieutenant Kingdom. The
load was most probably the receiver and display equipment for 6341 LWU and
there were six personnel from the unit on board. The combination encountered
the heavy flak in the 's-Hertogenbosch area that had, as recounted earlier,
claimed Stirling LK121 and its entire crew and resulted in Horsa 5000 landing
seven miles from of the LZ. Horsa 5003 was hit and it appears that its tail was
completely shot away from which there was no hope of recovery. The Stirling
managed to cut the tow and the glider crashed one kilometre south of the
station at Opheusden along the road to Doodeward – all on board were killed.
The senior officer on board was Flight Lieutenant Tisshaw with five other
ranks.
With no chance
of becoming operational it was now a case of survival. Personnel from both 5001
and 5002, in the company of some airborne troops, made their way to Oosterbeck.
However, after coming under fire en route the party became scattered.
Lieutenant Davis, a USAAC controller who had probably been on Horsa 5002,
'acquired' a jeep and after collecting as many LWU personnel as possible made a
dash for the Divisional HQ which had been set up at the Hartenstien Hotel. He
then set them to work digging in behind the hotel; their timing was good
because no sooner had they achieved a reasonable level of protection than the
Germans launched a very fierce and intense mortar attack. Radios were the
Achilles heels of the operation and the LWUs had lost all of theirs. The army
radios did not work and during the mortar attack the US air support team's
radio jeep, which was on loan to the Division, was damaged. The Americans
sought help from the RAF to repair their radios and LAC Roffer Eden, a
31-year-old Wireless Mechanic with 6080 LWU, set about trying to salvage
something. Shortly thereafter another mortar salvo rained down and Eden had his
jugular vein severed. Despite a valiant attempt by Davis to apply first aid,
Eden died later. At about the same time an 88mm round burst about 25 yards away
and Flight Sergeant Lievense RCAF, the senior radar engineer with 6080 LWU, was
hit three times in the back by shrapnel and he died of his wounds on 22nd
September 1944.
Keen to engage
the enemy on his own terms, Davis sought permission to lead a patrol of the
remaining airmen but this was refused because they were not infantry trained.
He then set about getting the men to dig their holes much deeper. This was a
very sensible measure considering the ferocity of the mortar bombardment that
seemed endless. Corporal Austin who had landed in Horsa 5000 was hit in the
head, back and buttocks and was taken to a hospital that was in German hands.
Clearly not one
to take no for an answer, Davis, who had infantry training, was allowed to go
on patrol and by all accounts he performed very well indeed. However, during a
mortar attack he was wounded in the foot and was then restricted to manning a
window in the Hartenstein hotel.
Leading
Aircraftman Eric Samwells was a twenty one year old radar operator with 6341
LWU and it appears that somehow he went on a patrol from which he did not
return.
The Retreat
By the 25th
September the defended perimeter around Oosterbeek had shrunk and there were
only some 700 yards of frontage on the river in British hands. The order was
given for a general retreat and some 2000 men escaped across the Rhine that
night. Amongst them were Squadron Leaders Coxon and Wheeler, Flight Lieutenant
Richardson and the wounded Lieutenant Davis. Staff Sergeant Edwards, the pilot
of Horsa chalk no 5002 and Sergeant Watson, the co-pilot of Horsa chalk no
5001, also escaped.
Postscript
Although the
LWUs never made an operational contribution the lessons learnt were put to good
effect. New air transportable systems were devised as follows:
•
Type
6 Mark IX. This LWS was mounted in a four-wheel drive truck with a trailer
which carried the communications equipment. It could be carried in a Hamilcar
glider and could be brought into action in 30 minutes after landing. Four of
these units were produced.
•
Type
6 Mark VIII. This was a light warning set which used an antenna that produced a
range not dissimilar to a larger mobile radar unit. It was equipped with GCI
cabins for control. It took four Dakota aircraft to deploy it and it could not
realistically be brought into action in under 24 hours.
•
Type
65. This was the most novel of the three systems which was known as 'Dinner
Wagon'. It comprised an LWS Type 6 and an American AN TPS 3 LWS mounted in a
Horsa with a special operations room incorporating additional displays and
equipment for linking in landlines and radio telephony equipments. The
best-known time achieved to bring this system into action after landing was 8
minutes. Two systems were constructed.
The unit to man
and operate these systems was formed under 60 Group and received technical
training from this group and number 38 group provided operational training. The
unit came under the operational control of the 6th Airborne Division (personnel
wore the divisional badge on their shoulder) and was commanded by a Wing
Commander with three operational squadrons each comprising four officers and 34
other ranks.
Conclusion
In many of the
numerous books on Operation Market Garden including the book written by Major
General Urquhart (GOC 1st Airborne Division) no reference is made to
the mobile radar force as part of the Order of Battle. Whilst RAF and Army Air
Corps history rightly makes much of the truly valiant efforts of those
transport, glider tug crews and gliders who delivered troops, supplies and
gliders to Arnhem, they make no similar effort to honour the role of the airmen
who landed to perform a vital air surveillance and control role and ultimately
had to fight for survival alongside the airborne forces. They paid a very heavy
price.
During World War
two the Air Ministry actively discouraged the 'Ace' culture. However, the
public liked heroes and battles in the air, and the Battle of Britain
especially provided a body of such men and the RAF policy became more honoured
in the breach than the observance.
However, radar
and, more importantly, the role of the various RAF radar units was secret and
the operational tasks undertaken by personnel from the Control and Reporting
(C&R) (now the Aerospace Battle Management) organisation was subsumed
within the Signals structure of the RAF. All this, coupled with the passage of
time which buries so much, played against the operational achievements and
contribution to victory of the C&R organisation being properly recognized
and honoured and it also played against officers like Wing Commander Brown
being recognized as 'Aces' in their own right. There are so many other
controllers, operators, engineers and maintenance personnel who will never be
recognised for what they did but bringing a fresh perspective of the
achievements of the C&R organisation and rescuing the stories like Arnhem
from the outer margins of history will, hopefully, go some way towards
redressing matters. The fate of the LWU force personnel that were sent into
Arnhem is known and it is summarised below.”
(Editorial note: There is a typographical error; the right hand column reading 6080 Light Warning Unit, should read 6341 Light Warning Unit.)
Again, it is with full recognition and sincerely expressed gratitude to the Association of RAF Fighter Control Officers, and their original pioneers, that this obscure corner of history can be told.
