It is rapidly approaching the 80th Anniversary of Operation Market-Garden, the World War II Battle of Arnhem (September 17-25 1944). It was a specific interest in this battle that initiated the Arnhem Jim blog in 2011, and which has provided the impetus for its growth and continuation to date. Suffices that the author’s companion interest in toy-soldiers/military miniatures, has served as a parallel vehicle for an apparent equal reader interest.
This being the case through the introduction in 1984 and 2007, of two series of miniatures conveniently named “Arnhem ’44” and “Market-Garden” by Andy C. Nielson of King & County Miliary Miniatures located in Hong Kong. Of coincidence, being this author’s opportunity to serve as technical consultant on one of his series military vehicles (Universal “Bren” Carrier, M Mk III).
However, returning to the principal subject of the anniversary of the battle, the author has spent over a decade of research and analysis documented in the blog; http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html
It is always gratifying as a rank amateur military historian, to be effectively acknowledged as correct by an established best selling author, and former active duty British Army officer, Antony Beevor.
With full acknowledgement and expressed gratitude the following recent article condenses analysis from his book, ARNHEM; The Battle for the Bridges, (Viking 2018).
"Why Operation Market Garden, the Allies' battle for Arnhem, was a disaster in the planning
Antony Beevor
Market Garden, the ill-fated Allied operation to break through the German defences in the Netherlands in September 1944, is often portrayed as a risky yet worthy gamble. In truth, argues historian Antony Beevor, it was a flawed idea from the start, more driven by ego than practical considerations.
There are many myths about the battle for Arnhem and Operation Market Garden. Historians of the battle have often been tempted into the ‘if-only’ trap. If only this, or if only that, had been different, then it would all have turned out to be a brilliant success. This cherry-picking of faults is a grave distraction from the harsh fact that Market Garden was a perfect example of how not to plan an airborne operation.
Market Garden was one of the greatest Allied disasters of the Second World War – immortalised in the 1977 film A Bridge Too Far. The plan was for Allied paratroopers and land forces to launch a combined attack, which would break through German defences in the Netherlands. Beginning on 17 September 1944, it ended in failure just a week later, resulting in thousands of casualties. The British airborne troops who spearheaded the assault suffered particularly badly in their doomed attempt to capture the bridge in the Dutch town of Arnhem.
A month earlier, the mood among the Allies had been very different, as their forces routed the Germans in the concluding phases of the Battle of Normandy. As they advanced towards the Reich, the Allied commanders now had to decide on the next step to take. It was here that the disastrous plan was born.
At the heart of the failure in preparation lay the ambition of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, who had commanded the Allied ground forces in Normandy. He wanted to seize control of Allied strategy by being first across the Rhine so that General Dwight D Eisenhower, supreme commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe, would have to give him full priority in supplies and command over American formations. The prospect of ‘jumping the Rhine’ with an airborne operation leading all the way to the bridge at Arnhem, the northern route into Germany, would force the First US Army to support him on his right flank.
To do this, Montgomery needed the First Allied Airborne Army, formed on 2 August 1944 on the order of Eisenhower, who thought a single agency was required to coordinate airborne and troop carrier units. Despite Eisenhower’s devotion to balanced Allied relations, its leadership was lopsided. US general Lewis Brereton’s staff consisted mainly of US air force officers. The only senior British officer was Brereton’s deputy, Lieutenant General Frederick Browning. Matters were not helped by a strong mutual dislike between Brereton and ‘Boy’ Browning. The only characteristic the two men shared was vanity.
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Browning, a hawk-faced Grenadier Guards officer with the air of a matinée idol, was married to the author Daphne du Maurier. Although brave, Browning was highly strung. He was desperate to command an airborne corps in action. His barely concealed ambition, combined with a peremptory manner, did not endear him to American paratroop commanders.
On 3 September, Montgomery met General Omar Bradley to discuss an airborne operation in south Belgium across the river Meuse. They agreed to cancel it, as Bradley wanted the troop carrier aircraft to deliver fuel to Patton’s Third Army. But Montgomery had not been straight with Bradley. He promptly ordered his chief of staff to organise an airborne operation “to secure bridges over Rhine between Wesel and Arnhem”. This was to be called Operation Comet, an idea in keeping with Montgomery’s ambition to lead the main push into Germany. Needless to say, Bradley was furious when he discovered that Montgomery had tricked him.
Freezing out the air force
‘Boy’ Browning was far from alone in his desire to use paratroop and glider forces in a decisive way. American generals longed to try out the new airborne army. Churchill also wanted the operation to boost British prestige. Victory euphoria following the rapid Allied advance from Normandy to Belgium fuelled a mood of optimism.
Unfortunately, Montgomery did not want to consult the RAF over Comet, even though the War Office and Air Ministry had agreed, following airborne chaos in the invasion of Sicily in 1943, that the air force side must lead the planning process. Montgomery even called Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory “a gutless bugger” because he had predicted disaster for the airborne drops that had taken place in the assault on Normandy.
On 9 September 1944, the commander of the Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, Major General Sosabowski, joined Roy Urquhart of the First Airborne Division to discuss Comet with Browning. “Sir,” said Sosabowski, “I am very sorry, but this mission cannot possibly succeed.” It would be suicide with such small forces, he said. Browning took deep offence.
In Belgium, General Dempsey, commanding the Second British Army, had just reached similar conclusions to those of Sosabowski. General Horrocks of the British XXX Corps (which would later play a key role in Market Garden) had confirmed that a bridgehead over the Albert Canal in north-east Belgium was “being strongly opposed by the enemy”.
The next morning, Dempsey went to Montgomery’s headquarters and managed to persuade him that Operation Comet was too weak. They needed at least three airborne divisions. Montgomery liked the idea. It would bring the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions under his command. But to Dempsey’s dismay, Montgomery also brandished a signal at him that had arrived from London. The first V2 rockets had landed in England, having apparently been fired from the area of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. For Montgomery, who wanted to go north via Arnhem (Dempsey preferred to go east), this was the just the confirmation he needed to justify his decision.
Dempsey summoned Browning. In just two hours, they put together a plan. Market Garden consisted of two parts. Market was the airborne operation, in which the American 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions would seize river and canal crossings from Eindhoven to Nijmegen, with the bridges over the rivers Meuse and Waal, the largest in Europe; the British First Airborne Division and the Polish brigade would drop near Arnhem to capture the great road bridge over the Lower Rhine. Operation Garden would consist principally of Horrocks’s XXX Corps, led by tanks, charging north to meet the airborne troops. They would have to travel up a single road, with flood plain on either side broken only by woods and plantations.
Montgomery’s complaints were halted by Eisenhower saying, 'Monty, you can’t speak to me like that'
Montgomery now headed for Brussels aerodrome to see Eisenhower. It was the famous meeting when Montgomery’s tirade of complaints was halted by Eisenhower putting his hand on Montgomery’s knee, and saying: “Monty, you can’t speak to me like that. I’m your boss.” Eisenhower reminded Montgomery that he had previously given him the support of the First Allied Airborne Army, yet this led to no more than a mention of Market Garden. Here, Eisenhower followed standard US Army practice. Having agreed an overall strategy, he did not believe in interfering further.
By the time Montgomery returned to his tactical headquarters, Dempsey had “fixed with [Browning] the outline of the operation”, his diary entry stated. Browning’s excitement was palpable. He sent the codeword ‘New’ from Dempsey’s HQ back to First Allied Airborne Army at Sunninghill Park. This signified that a planning conference was to be called that evening. Brereton must have been affronted that Montgomery had made no attempt to consult him in advance. Eisenhower had ordered that planning should be shared. Montgomery had deliberately ignored this.
Fateful meeting
Twenty-seven senior officers gathered in the Sunninghill Park conference room at 6pm. Astonishingly, neither Urquhart nor Sosabowski had been invited. Browning presented what he and Dempsey had worked out, using an airlift timetable based on an earlier operation. Disingenuously, he implied that it had Eisenhower’s blessing. Brereton and his staff privately dismissed it as just “a tentative skeleton plan”.
They first of all decided that it was to be a day operation because “the supporting air forces available could knock out flak positions in advance”. Brereton then asked Major General Williams of IX Troop Carrier Command to speak. His words must have come as a bombshell to Browning. Most of the key assumptions on which he and Dempsey had worked that day were now thrown in the air. “The lift would have to be modified, due to the distance involved, which precluded the use of double tow lift… single tow only could be employed.” This meant only half the number of gliders could be taken on each lift. And since the mid-September days were shorter and the mornings mistier, Williams ruled out two lifts in a day.
These changes signified that it would take up to three days to deliver the airborne divisions, assuming perfect flying weather. No more assault troops would be landing on the crucial first day than with Comet, because half the force would have to be left behind to guard landing and drop zones for later lifts. And the Germans, having identified Allied intentions, would be able to concentrate troops and anti-aircraft batteries against these areas. Williams’ obdurate attitude might have contained an element of revenge after Montgomery’s refusal to consult the air force side in advance, but Montgomery’s determination to impose an ill-considered plan was the real problem.
At a follow-up meeting, American air force officers more or less dictated the choice of drop and landing zones. Their main priority was to avoid German flak batteries on the way in and out. Major General Williams also rejected the idea of glider-borne coup de main parties (advance assault troops) to seize the main bridges, a key element in Comet.
Troop Carrier Command wanted to stay well away from the key objectives of Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges because of their anti-aircraft defences. At Arnhem, they were also threatened by the Luftwaffe airfield of Deelen just to the north of the town. As a result, the British division was to be dropped well to the west, with an approach march of between six and eight miles to the road bridge through a major town. Surprise, the most vital element in airborne operations, was therefore lost before they even took off.
An ill-conceived idea
Operation Market Garden was quite simply a very bad plan right from the start and right from the top. Every other problem stemmed from that. Montgomery had not shown any interest in the practical problems surrounding airborne operations. He had not taken any time to study the often chaotic experiences of north Africa, Sicily and the drop on the Cotentin peninsula in Normandy. His intelligence chief, Brigadier Bill Williams, also pointed to the way that: “Arnhem depended on a study of the ground [which] Monty had not made when he decided on it.” In fact, Montgomery obstinately refused to listen to Dutch warnings about the impossibility of deploying XXX Corps off the single raised road onto the polderland flood plain.
Towering over everything was the fact that the operation depended on everything going right, when it is an unwritten rule of warfare that no plan survives contact with the enemy. This is doubly true of airborne operations. The likelihood of the Germans blowing the road bridge at Nijmegen over the river Waal was barely discussed. Had they done so – and their failure to do so was an uncharacteristic mistake – XXX Corps could never have reached the First Airborne at Arnhem in time.
Flaws in the plan became more evident day by day, but Browning refused to advise Montgomery to reconsider the operation. On 12 September, Sosabowski heard that the number of gliders allocated to him had been reduced. He would have to leave behind all his artillery while his anti-tank guns would be landed on the opposite side of the river to his main force. Two days later, he pointed out that the bridgehead to be held extended for 10 miles in difficult terrain. There was thus the possibility that his brigade might have to drop straight onto enemy-held ground. And if the British failed to capture the bridge, the Poles would be left on the wrong side of the river.
Operation Market Garden was quite simply a very bad plan right from the start and right from the top
British brigade commanders were not nearly so critical, mainly because they could not face another cancellation. They just wanted to get on with it. And, in the view of Brigadier Hicks, who commanded the First Air Landing brigade, Market Garden at least seemed to stand a better chance than several “absolutely insane” previous plans.
Brigadier General Jim Gavin of the 82nd Airborne was appalled that Urquhart should have accepted drop and landing zones so far from his main objective. Yet Gavin himself had been told by Browning that his first priority was to secure the Groesbeek heights south-east of Nijmegen. They overlooked the Reichswald, a great forest just across the German border, thought to conceal tanks. Browning's argument was that if the Germans occupied the Groesbeek heights, then their artillery could stop XXX Corps reaching Nijmegen. Its great road-bridge thus slipped down to become a lower priority, partly because the First Allied Airborne Army refused to land coup de main glider parties.
Montgomery refused to listen when Eisenhower's HQ expressed concern about German strength around Arnhem. The SS Panzer Divisions Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg were indeed in the area, although with only three serviceable Panther tanks and fewer than 6,000 men between them. Yet they were still able to form a nucleus onto which other less experienced units could be grafted. What the Allies failed to grasp was the extraordinary ability of the German military machine to react with speed and determination. Almost all the tanks that Allied troops faced in Market Garden were not present at the start of the operation, but were brought in from Germany on Blitztransport trains.
Anyone with any experience of airborne operations could see that the British landing and dropping zones, up to eight miles to the west of Arnhem, were too far away to achieve surprise. Major General Richard Gale, who had commanded the Sixth Airborne Division on D-Day, warned Browning that the lack of coup de main parties was likely to be disastrous and that he would have resigned rather than accept the plan. Browning refused to agree and asked Gale not to mention it to anyone else as it might damage morale.
There was little Urquhart could do about the other basic flaw. While the First Parachute Brigade was to march off towards the bridge, Hicks’s First Airlanding Brigade would have to remain behind to guard the drop and landing zones ready for Hackett’s Fourth Brigade. This meant that Urquhart had just a single brigade to secure his chief objective, and his division would be split in two with a wide gap in-between. Worse still, his signals officers were rightly worried that their radios might not work over that distance.
Suicide operation
Urquhart gave no hint in any of his reports, or in his book written after the war, that he opposed the plan, but then he was not a man to rock the boat or contradict the subsequent version of events that Arnhem had been a heroic, worthwhile gamble. Yet according to General Browning’s aide, Captain Eddie Newbury, on 15 September Urquhart appeared in Browning’s office at Moor Park, and strode over to his desk. “Sir,” he said, “you’ve ordered me to plan this operation and I have done it, and now I wish to inform you that I think it is a suicide operation.” (Editorial Note: It is by virtue of the recollection of this quotation that MGEN Robert E. “Roy” Urquhart should be exonerated of any substantive responsibility for the failure of Operation Market-Garden.)
The fears of those who had grave doubts about Market Garden were soon realised. Out of the First Airborne Division, only a single battalion made it to the bridge at Arnhem and could hold no more than its northern approach. At Nijmegen, the 82nd Airborne lacked the strength to secure its flank on the German border and also seize the great bridge over the Waal until after the much-delayed Guards Armoured Division finally arrived. By then the battalion at the Arnhem bridge had been crushed, and on 25 September, the battered remnants of the First Airborne at Oosterbeek had to evacuate to the south bank of the Lower Rhine. Out of approximately 10,600 men north of the Rhine, some 7,900 were left behind – dead, wounded and PoWs.
The Dutch suffered not just the 3,600 killed and nearly 20,000 severely disabled in the fighting, but faced German vengeance afterwards for having helped the Allies. More than 200,000 civilians were forced from their homes, which were looted and destroyed. The northern Netherlands were then subjected to famine quite deliberately in what became known as the Hunger Winter, with around 18,000 dead from starvation. They were the chief victims of the disastrous plan for Operation Market Garden.
Who were the key Allied players in Operation Market Garden?
Eisenhower and Montgomery
THE CHIEF AND THE CHEERLEADER
The man in charge of Allied forces in Europe, Eisenhower found the opinionated hero of El Alamein, Montgomery, difficult to work with. Eisenhower even considered sacking Monty after Operation Goodwood, part of the Normandy campaign, but feared a backlash in Britain.
Frederick Browning
UP FOR THE FIGHT
The British deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army was desperate to command troops in battle and pushed to make Market Garden a reality.
Lewis H Brereton
SIDELINED FLYER
Monty didn’t consult Browning’s American boss – or any other airman – over Market Garden.
Stanisław Sosabowski
PLAIN-SPEAKING POLE
The paratrooper warned that Market Garden would fail. This infuriated British commanders and they took revenge.
Miles Dempsey
THE PLANNER
The commander of the British Second Army helped draw up Market Garden but was worried the plan had serious flaws.
Roy Urquhart
THE DUTIFUL SCEPTIC
Urquhart thought Market Garden to be “a suicide mission” but methodically helped bring the plan to fruition.
Williams
TRANSPORT CARRIER COMMAND
The USAAF general rejected key parts of the plan yet Browning did not tell Monty he should reconsider.
Antony Beevor is one of the leading historians of the Second World War. His new book is Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944 (Viking, 2018)."
For those readers who might be interested in learning additional information about Operation Market-Garden the following article from HISTORY EXTRA, with total acknowledgement and fully expressed gratitude;
"9 things you (probably) didn’t know about the battle of Arnhem
The battle of Arnhem (17–25 September 1944) was a bold – but ultimately failed – attempt to outflank German defences in north-west Europe by establishing a bridgehead across the lower Rhine river at the Dutch town of Arnhem. Author Iain Ballantyne reveals nine lesser-known facts about the battle.
The plan was for Allied paratroopers and land forces to launch a combined attack, which would break through German defences in the Netherlands. But the bridge at Arnhem was never captured – the plan ended in failure just a week later, resulting in thousands of casualties. Codenamed Operation Market Garden, it was the largest airborne operation in history and one of the biggest disasters of the Allied war effort.
Here, Iain Ballantyne, author of Arnhem: Ten Days in The Cauldron, reveals nine lesser-known facts about the battle immortalised in the 1977 film A Bridge Too Far…
During the battle of Arnhem in September 1944, great valour was shown by lightly armed British Airborne troops in the face of German panzers [tanks] and other heavy weaponry. Meanwhile, the people of the town on the Lower Rhine, and its suburb of Oosterbeek, suffered terribly as the combatants grappled to the death in their streets and even in their homes.
The prime objective of using 30,000 British and American paratroopers and glider-borne infantry to seize multiple river and canal crossing between the Dutch-Belgian border and the Rhine was to enable tanks and troops to dash up 64 miles of highway deep into the Netherlands. The British Second Army was then to make a right hook into Germany and take the Ruhr – the heart of the enemy war industries – intending to force the collapse of Hitler’s military machine.
However, another urgent priority was to capture territory in the Netherlands from which V2 ballistic missiles were being launched in an attempt to devastate London and other parts of southern England. That terrifying missile blitz had only just started in September 1944 when Operation Market Garden began, and the Allies badly wanted to snuff out the V2 threat.
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Sergeants J Whawell and J Turrell of the Glider Pilot Regiment of the 1st Allied Airborne Army search a bomb-damaged school in the Netherlands for snipers during the battle of Arnhem. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)
When looking at this famous episode in the Second World War, I decided to focus on the struggle at the very tip of the lunge into the Netherlands. In writing Arnhem: Ten Days in The Cauldron, I was able tease out of the stories of individual soldiers and civilians caught up in the chaos and destruction of a savage battle, including some remarkable aspects that offer a more nuanced understanding even 75 years on.
Three Bridges Too Far
The decision to extend the attack so far behind enemy lines was famously described by Lt General Frederick ‘Boy’ Browning – top field commander of the Allied Airborne forces – as possibly “a bridge too far”. This remark was made to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, the overall commander of the British-led 21st Army Group and mastermind of Market Garden, when he and Browning were discussing the plan.
When Montgomery asked Browning if the 1st Airborne Division could take and hold the road bridge at Arnhem for two days, Browning suggested his troops could do it for twice as long – but added a telling caveat about the wisdom of the plan’s final objective: “I think we might be going a bridge too far,” said Browning. This famous response inspired the title of Irish reporter and historian Cornelius Ryan’s classic book on the operation, A Bridge Too Far, which was itself made into a spectacular star-studded Hollywood war movie in the mid-1970s.
In fact, it was a case of three bridges too far. Not only were the British Airborne troops asked to capture the road bridge over at Arnhem, but also a railway bridge and pontoon bridge. The former was blown up as paratroopers ventured onto it, while the latter had been dismantled.
Germans v Germans
The first soldiers of the 1st Airborne Division to drop into the Netherlands on 17 September 1944 were the 21stIndependent Parachute Company, the pathfinders who marked out the Drop Zones (DZs) and Landing Zones (LZs) and set up homing beacons. Among them were Germans and Austrians who had assumed fake British identities in order to fight the Nazis. They were Jewish refugees who had fled persecution in their homelands and were determined to exact payback on behalf of loved ones and families who had suffered so much under Adolf Hitler.
They were very fierce soldiers and, despite the fact they would probably be shot as traitors if taken prisoner, they made no secret of their identities, shouting insults at their foes in German.
Dutch bullets, Dutch kisses
On 18 September, when the second lift of 1st Airborne Division troops was going DZs and LZs beyond Arnhem – leaping from their Dakota troop transports or coming to earth in gliders – they were shot at by Dutch soldiers. Those troops belonged to Landstorm Nederland, a unit of the Waffen SS composed of Nazi collaborators. Dutch SS troops even fought soldiers of the Free Netherlands Army’s Princess Irene Brigade during earlier battles, in northern Belgium.
No sooner had some British soldiers survived the experience of being shot at by the Dutch SS near Arnhem than they were being embraced and kissed by overjoyed locals. The civilians came out to the DZs and LZs to greet the British soldiers with water and wine, to celebrate liberation, which sadly proved short lived.
War among the people
The majority of Dutch civilians of course hated the Nazis and yearned to be free of a brutal occupation after more than four years of oppression. They greeted the arrival of British troops with great joy, but, in the subsequent battle, thousands of them were trapped in the cellars of their homes in Arnhem town and neighbouring Oosterbeek.
As the Airborne soldiers shot at the enemy from rooms in houses on once-pleasant and pristine streets, beneath their feet civilians sheltered in the cellars and miserably awaited their fate. Enduring terrible conditions for days – going short of water and food, their homes destroyed above them as exploding artillery shells, machine gun fire and grenades roared all around – they were often terrified. Hundreds of civilians were killed during the fighting, but the astonishing thing is that thousands of those who took refuge in cellars survived.
On emerging from the cellars, they were told by the Germans to leave and not come back: anyone who did not evacuate themselves from Oosterbeek and Arnhem would be shot.
Despite the British bringing ruin to their homes, the Dutch people to this day salute the sacrifice of the Airborne soldiers who tried and failed to lift the yoke of fascist oppression.
Suffer not the animals
Suffering alongside the humans as the battle raged in the streets, fields, woods and gardens were animals — some of which fought back. One British soldier who threw himself into a slit trench to escape death under German bombardment found he was sharing it with a fierce little squirrel. It proceeded to attack him and had very sharp teeth. Hurling the animal out, the soldier found the squirrel determined not to yield. It bolted back into the trench and burrowed underneath him.
During the battle at Oosterbeek, a Dutch girl (who could speak English) pleaded with a British paratrooper to help her care for a horse, which was in a barn behind her house. He reluctantly took her out to feed and water the animal, fearing they would be shot down. Yet the Germans held their fire while Corporal Harry Tucker and the girl cared for the animal. Tucker later said: “I told the girl to hurry up with feeding and watering the horse. We then went back across the yard and she thanked me for helping her. The thing that still amazes me is that not a single shot was fired at us during the whole episode. Maybe the Germans were showing us some mercy, or maybe they were just temporarily out of ammo.”
One British officer even brought an animal with him to Arnhem from England. This was Myrtle the (so-called) parachick, a hen who jumped into battle strapped to the shoulder of paratrooper Lieutenant Pat Glover in a special canvas bag. Sadly, during a skirmish Myrtle was exposed to fire and killed.
Just pick up the phone
The radio problems suffered by the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem are well-known. The radios may have worked sufficiently in carefully controlled exercises on Salisbury Plain, but they did not function well in the tree-lined suburbs, woods and polder of Holland [lowland reclaimed from a body of water by building dikes and drainage canals]. However, the British could have just picked up the phone. Much of the local telephone system functioned throughout the battle and was used to great effect by the Germans, who had seen a lot of their radio equipment destroyed during the retreat from Normandy. The British made limited use of the telephones as they did not trust them to be secure.
The famous episode in the 1977 movie A Bridge Too Far, in which 1st Airborne Division commander Major General Roy Urquhart (played by Sean Connery) is forced by radio problems to race around in a jeep, trying to speak to his commanders face-to-face, is absolutely true. Not only was Urquhart at one point trapped in an attic while evading enemy patrols, but he really did shoot dead a German soldier wo made the mistake of peering in the front window of another house the general was hiding in.
Vera Lynn and other psychological warfare
Radio contact was established with higher command headquarters and even between some units, when ranges were short. As part of normal practice, both sides listened in to each other’s radio broadcasts and tried to interfere with them. They exchanged insults over the airwaves, sometimes also masquerading as each other in attempts to glean intelligence or trip up their foe.
The Germans tried to break the British troops’ spirit by broadcasting loudspeaker messages suggesting their sweethearts were missing them and that senior British commanders had been taken prisoner. They even tried to make the British homesick by broadcasting Vera Lynn songs, which, rather than break the Airborne troops’ morale, raised their spirits. The British replied with loud curses and used their weapons to destroy the offending enemy loudspeakers.
At the Arnhem bridge, the senior Waffen SS commander thought he could persuade Lt Col John Frost, commander of the British force, to surrender by sending a captured Airborne soldier to tell him resistance was useless. They best give up or die! Frost decided such a tactic was evidence of enemy desperation. He and his troops became even more determined to keep on fighting, hoping Allied tanks and troops charging up the highway would soon reach his besieged force.
For the Allies, the war was not over
Eventually, with very few weapons left to fight the panzers, the British at the Arnhem road bridge surrendered. When the 1st Airborne Division – trapped in a cauldron of fire at Oosterbeek, with its back to the river – withdrew across the Rhine, it left behind several thousand wounded and/or captured soldiers, in addition to 1,200 dead.
Many of these elite troops were determined that this was not going to be the end of the matter. Hundreds of them evaded the enemy, or almost immediately escaped captivity to go on the run and into hiding with brave Dutch hosts. Some escaped from prison camps in Germany. As the Reich collapsed in April and May 1945, many of the remaining PoWs found themselves left to their own devices by guards who disappeared to avoid capture by the Allies.
Along the way, while hiding out with a Dutch family, Deane-Drummond would visit nearby homes to listen to secret radios in an attempt to keep up with news from the outside world. During one listening session he met Baroness van Heemstra, whose family came from Arnhem, mother to 15-year-old daughter Edda – who would after the war be known to the world as the Hollywood actress Audrey Hepburn. The future movie star’s mother later sent a bottle of champagne to the house where Deane-Drummond was hiding to cheer him up.
Working with the SAS, Dutch Resistance and British intelligence operatives, some fugitive 1st Airborne Division officers organised a mass escape over the Rhine in late 1944. The British escapers were organised into fully armed units and, with assistane from American paratroopers and Canadian assault engineers, finally got out of enemy territory.
Hitler’s last victory in the west
Arnhem was the last time the Germans inflicted a major defeat on the Allies in the west. From then on, they lost every battle against the British, American and Canadian armies, while the Red Army steamroller shattered German armies in the east. At Arnhem, and also during the subsequent Ardennes offensive of December 1944, the Germans expended their last military capital in the west. While the fighting remained hard in the west, the British-led forces in the north were able to send a massive airborne and amphibious assault across the Rhine in spring 1945. The Reich was finished.
It would be going too far to say the western Allies could have perhaps taken Berlin if the Germans had lost at Arnhem. It was not in Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower’s endgame plan to do so, as he preferred to leave that bloody job to the Russians. Yet, the effort involved in achieving victory at Arnhem and staging the Ardennes attack helped sap German forces at a time when they needed everything they could get to defend the Reich itself.
Iain Ballantyne is a journalist, editor, and author who has written several military history books, including those on the Second World War and the Cold War. His latest book, Arnhem: Ten Days in The Cauldron, is his second title for Agora Books, following on from Bismarck: 24"
Specific Events
Individuals with a specific interest in attending currently scheduled events are advised to refer to URL;
https://arnhem1944fellowship.org/arnhem-commemorations-2024/.
Military miniatures commemorating Operation Market-Garden Battle of Arnhem
Others who may be interested in obtaining military miniatures recreating the battle may want to refer to following specific articles within this blog;
http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2011/03/whats-form-general-mgen-re-urquhart-at.html
http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2011/03/battle-of-arnhem-whos-son-and-heir.html
https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2014/03/a-photographic-catalog-operation-market.html
http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2015/09/operation-market-garden-series-by-king.html
http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2015/09/wolfheze-junction-it-werent-no-ok.html
https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2017/09/an-addendum-to-photographic-catalog.html
