British WWII MRC (Medical Research Council) Body Armour

One of the more esoteric and rare pieces of WWII British militaria is a piece of equipment called MRC Body Armour. It is comprised of three pieces of 1mm thick manganese steel (same as used in helmets) plate which are padded with heavy felt pads, each then sewn into a khaki light web/canvas covering, and fastened together by a series of riveted web straps with adjustable brass buckles, and a pair of brass hooks and elongated steel flat loops. The total assembly weighing 3 1/2 pounds.

In April 1942, the Military Research Council gave the go-ahead for standardizing personal protective equipment and beginning their mass production with a forecast of 3.5 million. Eventually, 200,000 sets of Briggs Bodies Motors (major manufacturer of the British Parachutist helmet (HSAT) and Harrison & Bros Howsons were produced by 1944, but only 79,000 were actually used and distributed among the army (3,100 for the Canadian Armed Forces, 6,000 for the paratroopers, for the SAS 400, for the Polish paratroopers 2500 ) And the Royal Air Force.

The author is not certain regarding the specific origin of the example which will be presented in this article. It is either very early British production for the British forces during WWII (See the following image; HQ, 56th Div., 11 Corps, Eastern Command, taken on 21 March 1942), or the known immediate post war production for the Belgian military forces (country or manufacturer unknown).  Two principle indicators are the light green drab hue, compared with a lighter tan khaki of the vast majority of WWII British web equipment, and the fact that someone has seen fit to obscure a marking on the under side of the center plate, for one reason or another. Another indication is that the assembly and stitching of the cloth material in each of the three plates does not seem to come up to the normal quality control expected of either British or Canadian manufacture. While most fittings, including rivets, are brass, there is an exception in that the small plates attaching the webbed straps to each of the three plates, and the two elongated slot fittings, brass riveted to the lower corners of the front center rectangular plate appear to be steel. This detail is consistent with all British production. One thing for certain it is not a replica. The image of a known reproduction by Kay Canvas is shown further below for contrast/comparison.

Unfortunately there is a paucity of surviving examples outside of museums and private collections to compare with. However, given a comparison with all the details of known British manufactured examples, strongly indicates this specimen is also of British manufacture. One of the singular documented use of MRC Body Armour in combat action, is by the British and Polish Airborne Forces during Operation ‘Market - Garden’. There is a specific classic photograph of a group of Polish doctors in battledress, surgical aprons, and MRC body armour, in a forward Field Ambulance Unit aid station. Another unit that was known to have used the armour were members of the Glider Pilot Regiment. One of the main reasons for the rarity of historical photographic evidence, is that the prescribed way of wearing the equipment, is strapped on the inside of an individual’s battledress uniform. The MRC armour was found to be uncomfortable to wear, consequently not widely used. 

The first image to be presented is an example on display, formerly at the Airborne Forces Museum at Altershot, Hants. Note that it is displayed on a Glider Pilot Regiment battledress blouse. 

Another source, in a different view, attributes the same display after having been moved to the Airborne Assault Museum, Duxford.

A different set of MRC body armour on another battledress blouse at the Airborne Assault Museum at Duxford. Note you don't see the 1st glider pilot's brevet on the battledress.

This is followed by the museum's display of another set with a group of distinguished decorations (DSO w/bar, MC, and campaign medals) along with a Denison smock and maroon beret. After protracted observation under magnification the cap badge on the beret can be tentatively identified as Royal Army Medical Corps (brass, correct basic shape, k.c.). With both acknowledgment and gratitude to Ben Hill, ParaData Manager, Airborne Assault Museum, the Denison and MRC armour belonged to a sapper, i.e. (RE, REME), named Denning, and the group of decorations and medals are those of LtCol. Richard T.H. "Dickie" Lonsdale, DSO w/bar, MC, of Lonsdale Force, Oosterbeek, Operation 'Market-Garden'.

Unfortunately the next set of images does not have source attribution other than from an author's personal collection, however comes from a web site with an extensive discussion of the use of MRC body armour by Canadian military forces during WWII.

Following two images are an original and a reconstruction of the MRC body armour as employed by the Canadian Army during WWII.

The next example is an acknowledged  currently produced replica set, clearly marked by the manufacturer Kay Canvas.

The following set of images is from this author's personal collection (found at the Great Western Gun Show in Pomona, Ca. in 1998), clearly showing a discernible difference in the color, as well as a certain wanting in manufacturing quality control. The flatness of all the plates as issued  would indicate a large size (not known whether armour was issued in sizes). This has been corrected as seen in this photography, successfully flexed to the correct curvature.The author would be most appreciative of any reader's further insight regarding the origin of the armour.

The three components, front and back, of the author's example of MRC body armour with the steel plates having been correctly contoured to their intended curvature (no small task if done right). With the plates curved, the armour seems to be rather small in size. This leads one to believe that the obliteration of a marking on the reverse side of the square plate may have been to conceal a small size marking, judging from the length of the straps.

Here are a final two examples, the first apparently being either white or "blancoed", and manufactured for the Belgian army for either a stretcher-bearer, or for use with a winter camouflaged uniform. Said to have been found 20 years ago in a scrapyard un-marked, at that time sold for the equivalent of $351.00 USD, and the other of unknown origin, of a very light grey hue of khaki tan.

Uniform of a Colonel of Airborne Forces (VDV)/Spetsnaz, Soviet Military Forces, circa 1991

With the downfall of the Soviet Union in August of 1991, subsequently there was a short time window when all manner of Soviet Military Forces then current, genuine uniforms and equipment became available to the West. Simultaneously the author was retiring from naval intelligence with the U.S. Naval Reserve after 29 years.

Having acquired a reasonable knowledge of the armed forces of the Soviet Union over that span of time, I decided to acquire a mini collection representative of our “former adversary”, for posterity. In addition, to the best of this author’s knowledge, as of this point in time there has not been any significant replication, i.e. fake uniform/insignia/equipment production, with the single exception of fake caps.

The following is an excerpt from a website article from a major store specializing in Soviet uniforms and equipment:

“When I first started this site in 2003, I indicated fakes were not a major concern for Soviet uniform/cap collectors. This was true at the time, since there was a major "glut" of authentic caps entering the market. But since then, a major fake/replica industry has developed. When fakes first showed up - they were usually high-end types, general and admiral caps made with authentic materials left over from the collapse of the USSR, which were rarely encountered by the casual collector. The next wave of reproductions were just that - reproductions intended primarily for the military re-enactors, especially for WWII. Now, however, a large percentage of Soviet caps offered for sale on auction sites and on Soviet militaria websites are fake. Many of these modern fakes are coming out of Ukraine although others now originate from Pakistan. Interestingly enough, the quality of most current replica general and admiral caps has deteriorated (with silk embroidery vice metal wire embroidery), while fake Soviet officer and soldier caps are often very well made with materials very close to the originals. So be VERY CAREFUL when buying a cap that looks new. Ask me if you have any doubts before buying something you're unsure of. I am always happy to help. In the following paragraphs I have attempted to discuss these different categories of "fake" caps, why they exist and what to look for in "suspect" caps.”

The serious collector of Soviet vintage militaria is well advised to visit the following: http://www.undertheredstar.com/fakes.htm  

So obviously this article is intended to provide the reader with a set of imagery which can be used to compare with any suspected items. Of specific interest should be the labels and/or stamps that are found on the uniforms, hats, and equipment. The other element of authenticity to be observed are the various sets of flaps/tabs, and the integral concealed holster for a Makarov in the jacket. This occurrence was precisely why this author acquired all of his Soviet collection very early on in the 1991-1992 time frame.

I chose a field service uniform of a Colonel of the Russian Airborne Forces or VDV (from "Vozdushno-desantnyevoyska Rossii", Russian: Воздушно-десантные войска России, ВДВ; Air-landing Forces). Basically the uniform consists of the M1984 “Flora” pattern camouflaged jacket and trousers, in addition to the classic light blue and white striped telniashka and turquoise blue beret. Officers and NCO’s most commonly wore a brown leather Sam Brown type belt, with a matching brown leather holster (w/spare magazine pocket) configured for the 9x18mm Makarov PM pistol, or the wood or plastic combination stock/holster for the 9x18mm Stechkin APS machine pistol.

Having reviewed a reasonably extensive reference library, it can stated that other than the subdued insignia which will be seen on the included imagery, no other distinguishing insignia is wore on this specific uniform, not even their parachutist jump qualification badge. Having been said, there is always at least one known exception; being the late VDV Lieut General Alexander Lebed during the turbulent early 90s, with the demise of the Soviet Union. He is seen (with attribution and gratitude to alamy), taking an oath of allegiance wearing lieut general officer's service shoulder boards. Note the other officers in the photo are not. It is the identical uniform, with exception of lower rank, which I will be describing.

There are other post-Soviet era images showing a similar uniform with an extensive array of insignia, but the uniform’s camouflage pattern is decidedly different than the Soviet “Flora” pattern. An example is the following image of the late Lieut Colonel Anatoly Lebed, Hero of the Russian Federation, who was a Spetsnaz officer. Note his distinctive badge incorporating a wolf and bat-like wings.

There is a range of headgear, in addition to the classic blue beret, which were wore by all ranks of the VDV and Spetsnaz. Surprising a camouflaged “deer-slayer” type utility hat, with a subdued cap badge was worn quite frequently. It will be shown in the imagery. In addition the khaki cloth padded jump helmet and the winter service, blue-grey, wool and synthetic fur ushanka, will also be depicted.

Here are additional images of the classic VDV/Spetsnaz turquoise blue beret, showing both details of the beret and its labeling.

As previously discussed, one of the other very common caps worn during the waining days of the Soviet Union was what the author choses to call a "deer-slayer" utility type cap, in a camouflaged "Flora" pattern.

The next significant uniform item is the classical turquoise blue and white striped, long sleeved wool jersey called the telniashka.

Next is the summer weight "Flora" camouflaged M1984 jacket with subdued insignia and the integral concealed holster for the Makarov pistol.

The camouflaged trousers have one feature to be mentioned, that being a pair of straps which can be fastened under each foot to hold the pant legs in the boot.

Believe these to be enlisted, not officer's (which are taller by 2" and smooth black leather), field service boots of pebble-grained black leather, however commonly worn by all ranks. Their surface is very similar to the classic WWII British Army ammunition boot.

The final element of the normal field service uniform is the brown leather holster and Sam Brown type belt.

The specific 9x18mm Makarov pistol depicted is somewhat unique, and is discussed in detail in a previous article in this blog: https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2018/02/an-interesting-makarov-pistol-open-to.html.

As was previously discussed, there was no additional insignia wore with the uniform, however the next image displayed shows an array of insignia normally wore on either service or parade dress by both VDV and the Spetsnaz units.

The Captain's dress shoulder boards, collar tabs and VDV branch of arms, along with the Guards designated award, various grades of parachute jump proficiency and master grade proficiency are more readily recognized. The large patch with the wolves head, parachute canopy and wings is the 218th VDV Spetsnaz Battalion. The Soviet Naval Infantry (also wore by Naval Spetsnaz), is followed on the lower right by the KGB Interior Troops branch of arms. The remaining two badges are the Voyage pin of the Aircraft Carrier Kuznetzov (1993) and the pilot's wings of The Soviet Air Force (VVS), sniper pilot grade (1990).

The remaining two items are the standard jump helmet of the VDV, somewhat of a hybrid of a Soviet tanker's helmet and a British WWII sorbo training helmet for parachutists, and finally the VDV  officer's winter ushanka.

  

"Know thy enemy - Know thyself" - Sun Tzu

On very infrequent occasion this author begs the indulgence of the reader in addressing subjects of a more in-depth and profound nature, far a field from the escape to the subject of toy soldiers.

Amongst the many profound wisdoms of the Chinese general and military strategist Sun Tzu is the saying (variable translations and wording); “Know thy enemy, know thyself. A thousand battles, a thousand victories.” 

In a brand-new article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 2020) this wisdom is reiterated in a penetrating discussion by two currently active duty naval intelligence professionals. It particularly struck this author with both its insight and significance. Reflecting in retirement on my dual career as a weapon systems engineer/threat analyst and naval intelligence officer, am able to personally relate the importance of their thesis based upon two specific cases, both of which have been previously related in this blog’s posts; http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2013/04/one-of-don-quixotes-broken-lances_19.html

http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2016/11/what-now-don-quixote-another-windmill.html

While the perspective conveyed in those blog posts is much narrower in context than that envisioned by the authors, I think they show the critical importance in conducting threat analysis through quantitively evaluating the interactive engagement of own capabilities with those of the enemy. This total perspective is of particular priority both during the initial design and development of weapon systems, but in their employment, i.e. strategy and tactics, as well.

With both gracious full acknowledgment of their knowledge and insight, as well as sincere gratitude to both authors, what follows is their Proceedings article in its entirety;

  

“Naval Intelligence Must Relearn Its Own Navy”
To best support their warfighting customers, naval intelligence professionals must know the threat and U.S. combat capabilities.
By Commander Christopher Nelson, U.S. Navy, and Eric Pedersen
February 2020
Naval Institute Proceedings 

A common saying in U.S. naval intelligence is “We don’t do blue.” It means intelligence professionals do not analyze and report on U.S. naval operations, combat capabilities, or doctrine—blue forces—but instead focus on the adversary: red forces.

The saying is inaccurate, and it obscures a larger problem. “We don’t do blue” was never meant to mean “We don’t need to know blue.” That, though, is how too many in the community have interpreted it for far too long. Today, the sad truth is most naval intelligence officers lack even a basic understanding of U.S. naval combat power.

Factors beyond the basic cultural resistance expressed in “We don’t do blue” have compounded the problem. Including naval intelligence in the Navy’s information warfare community has resulted in additional officer qualification requirements. The naval intelligence officer career path does not consistently and broadly expose officers to U.S. naval combat capabilities. And, most significantly, the United States has spent the past three decades without a peer naval power.

Certainly, naval intelligence officers must focus primarily on the threat (red intentions and capabilities), but they cannot give their operational customers sophisticated threat assessments unless they also have strong foundational knowledge of U.S. military capabilities, particularly naval ones. 

Operational commanders need intelligence professionals who can clearly communicate what an adversary can do, is doing, and might do in the future. That will never change. It is and will remain the intelligence profession’s primary purpose. Thus, any conversation about adversary intentions and behavior also must consider how adversaries view U.S. naval power and operations. Without such insights, when intelligence officers stand up and deliver enemy weapon ranges and basic red tactics and doctrine, they are describing only part of the story.

If the community wants to provide sound assessments to the commanders it serves, naval intelligence professionals must develop a good understanding of U.S. naval forces. That will mean going back to basics. The journey will include significant and costly changes to training and processes. 

Anecdotal evidence shows that both junior and senior officers lack key knowledge of U.S. naval combat capabilities, platforms, weapons, and sensors. For example, we recently conducted an informal four-question survey with 20 junior intelligence officers: What is an SM-2? What is its range? What is a Mk 48? What is its range? The results were not surprising—disheartening, yes, but not surprising. Only half could identify an SM-2, and only three could identify a Mk 48 (it is a torpedo). Only two came close to the weapons’ ranges, and they were both former surface warfare officers. And these are not niche weapons. The Standard Missile 2 is the Navy’s primary antiair missile fitted on almost all destroyers and cruisers. The Mk 48 is the submarine force’s heavy torpedo for antisubmarine and antisurface warfare.

U.S. Navy Standard Missile SM-2 surface-to-air missile

U.S. Navy submarine launched acoustic homing torpedo MK 48

Recent anecdotal data from the U.S. Naval War College’s Halsey Alfa group suggests that midgrade and senior naval intelligence officers also lack sufficient blue knowledge. Halsey Alfa is a “collaborative student-faculty research effort at the Naval War College that employs military operations research and free play war gaming to examine in detail high intensity conventional warfare.”1 Each year about 15 officers, O-4 to O-5 (predominantly joint warfighters and intelligence officers) form the group to “analyze and war game theater-level contingencies.”2 

For two years, Halsey Alfa gave incoming students a 60-question test to establish a baseline of their professional knowledge. Questions covered modern warfighting systems, relevant geography, and basic scientific principles relating to weapons and sensors. The questions included “the range of common weapons like the Harpoon or DF- 21D missiles, the conversion factor for kilometers to nautical miles, the location of Kadena Air Base, the relative frequency of S-Band versus L-Band on the [radio frequency] spectrum, and the difference between a [low-earth orbit] and a [geo-synchronous] satellite orbit.”3 On average, intelligence officers scored 65—barely a passing grade.4 

Unfortunately, the Navy does not have any empirical data on officers’ knowledge about their own platforms beyond results from limited testing in their tactical-technical specialties. There are no tests of joint warfighting knowledge at any level in the Navy. From the anecdotal evidence, however, the state of affairs is not encouraging.5 

While junior intelligence officers struggle to learn and stay current on threat capabilities, many U.S. Navy platforms will remain in service for their entire careers. Naval intelligence professionals should learn basic blue combat capabilities early in their careers.

It is Not All About Red 

To understand the complexities of a foreign navy is a daunting task. Today’s naval intelligence officers must keep up with a massive array of sophisticated threats from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, while also understanding the variety of threats Navy personnel confront in the war on terrorism.

The Navy must be ready to execute a wide range of missions anywhere in the world at a moment’s notice. Operating in such a complex environment underscores the critical role naval intelligence plays. Navy leaders must decide what capabilities to buy and where and how to operate with limited resources. They deserve the very best information to guide those critical decisions, and the task of providing that information falls largely to naval intelligence.

Providing quality threat assessments requires understanding an adversary’s mind-set to anticipate his actions. That is a fundamental competency of intelligence. Without understanding what an adversary is trying to accomplish and why, it is impossible to anticipate its moves. In many cases, the capabilities of the U.S. military, and the Navy in particular, have been the primary drivers of adversary development of doctrine, capabilities, and tactics. Adversaries scrutinize the U.S. threat to formulate a response. When the United States fields a weapon, they field a counter; when they field a weapon, the United States fields a counter; and so forth. Attempting to predict adversary actions without understanding their threat perceptions of U.S. capabilities and intentions is a losing proposition. 

A deep understanding of U.S. capabilities and limitations raises the intelligence officer’s professional game. First, officers with that knowledge can quickly and accurately prioritize threats. Second, knowledge of U.S. forces enables them to identify adversary weaknesses most vulnerable to exploitation. Third, a complete perspective of blue and red operations helps them discover adversary intelligence successes. During the Cold War, for instance, intelligence officers’ deep knowledge of blue and red forces led them to suspect Soviet penetration of Navy operations. They were later proven correct.6

Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Version 2.0 states that China and Russia “have been studying our methods over the past 20 years” and “are gaining a competitive advantage and exploiting our vulnerabilities.” It is not difficult to imagine a Chinese or Russian naval officer scoring better than 65 on the Halsey Alfa test. Thus, naval intelligence must not leave overworked operational commanders, staffs, and senior decision makers on their own to sort through threat assessments and apply them to blue capabilities. Instead, it owes them a partner more valuable than they have today: a fully informed intelligence officer to help them arrive at the best tactical and operational solutions.

Build Blue Knowledge 

Senior naval intelligence leaders can make several changes to improve the community’s knowledge of U.S. combat power. None will be easy, but each of the following recommendations can help build a basic working knowledge of U.S. naval weapons and capabilities. 

Include a robust section on U.S. naval combat platforms and weapons in the information warfare officer’s personnel qualification standard. A primer on U.S. platforms at an early stage in an officer’s career will set a baseline that can be built on over time. Intelligence officers do not broadly cover this material in their careers because there is simply too little time. Officers have to study on their own to learn the warfighting capabilities of the squadron or ship with which they serve, often cramming the material as quickly as possible.

Rotate more intelligence officers to independent deployments of destroyers and cruisers. This would give intelligence officers more time at sea and exposure to a larger portion of the surface navy and, in turn, would provide independent deployers and their intelligence specialists a better understanding of regional threats and adversary naval capabilities. It also would align with Design 2.0 and the distributed maritime operations strategy. In a communication-degraded environment, it will be necessary to push more personnel from intelligence centers to the waterfront.

Create a longer mid-career intelligence milestone course (weeks if not months) with rigorous testing and student ranking. This should include tactics instructors to discuss Navy combat capabilities and a robust discussion on Chinese, Russian, North Korean, and Iranian threats. After the intelligence officer basic course, naval intelligence officer training is an à la carte experience—a course here and there in preparation for whatever job comes next. The community cannot determine if a standard of professional knowledge is maintained. In the aviation and surface warfare communities, mid-level operators are required to demonstrate their knowledge in a classroom, simulator, or when they return to the cockpit. The intelligence community should do the same.

During long maintenance periods, regularly rotate intelligence officers from ship’s company (aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious ships) to underway units or an established intelligence career course. Currently, intelligence officers are kept on board ships during maintenance availabilities, then expected to develop deep knowledge of regional threats in a matter of months prior to a deployment.

During maintenance periods, officers and enlisted supervise intelligence spaces, process clearances, support maintenance, stand watch, and attend schools and conferences, often in the local area of the ship’s home port. This is important work, but intelligence knowledge degrades significantly during maintenance periods. Workups are intended to get the intelligence department up to speed and ready to deploy. Naval intelligence will soon find that as adversaries modernize and field new weapons, workups will not allow enough time to absorb the amount of information necessary to keep the commanders informed when deployment begins.

Naval intelligence must assess its shortfalls and debate ways to educate intelligence officers on blue forces. Top- down solutions, even the adoption of the suggestions offered here, will not by themselves close the community’s knowledge gap.

The best intelligence officers will do what they have always done—educate themselves the best they can on red and blue capabilities—but the community needs to consider innovative ideas. The next generation must develop and maintain a high-level understanding of red and blue capabilities.

1. See the U.S. Naval War College website.
2. Jim FitzSimonds, Professional Illiteracy, unpublished manuscript (2019). 3. FitzSimonds. 

4. Jim FitzSimonds, personal communication, 9 July 2019. Intelligence officer average was 65 (although it was a small number of students). The high score over two years was 76 by a Hornet pilot with intense interest in a broad range of military subjects. Even more disconcerting is the overall class average of 19 out of 100. 

5. FitzSimonds, personal communication. 

6. Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, The Admirals’ Advantage (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 192. Former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Richard Haver, then an OPINTEL analyst, was concerned the Soviets had penetrated U.S. Navy codes. The arrest of the John Walker Lindh spy ring confirmed his suspicions. Naval Intelligence 

Commander Christopher Nelson 

Commander Nelson is the Deputy Senior Naval Intelligence Manager for East Asia in the Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland, Maryland. He is a career naval intelligence officer and graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in Newport, Rhode Island.

Eric Pedersen 

Mr. Pedersen is the Senior Naval Intelligence Manager for East Asia in the Office of Naval Intelligence. He is a former naval intelligence officer and graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Rather than further boring the reader with having to read both of the previously referenced blog posts, this synopsis should be able to convey the essence of the author’s experiences. It occurred during the course of my dual career as a weapons system engineer/threat analyst, and naval intelligence officer during the preliminary design and subsequent construction of the lead ship of the class, USS Spruance Class Destroyer (DD-963) in the 1970s.

In one of the first design reviews scheduled by the then Navy’s Ships Systems Command (then NAVSHIPS, now Naval Seas System Command – NAVSEA) Program Office for the DD-963 I had the opportunity to review my work to that point with two LCDRs (Lieut-Commanders) from that office. Their names will remain anonymous. I expressed my grave concerns regarding the fact that in 4 out 5 (or 6, unfortunate lapse of memory) of the detailed threat scenarios provided, that the November Class SSN (at the time already it had been in service for 10 years)  was able to achieve effective launch range of the stipulated operational Soviet submarine torpedoes, prior to effective own ship reaction/response time, i.e., detection, classification, target designation, target motion analysis, launcher/weapon orders, weapon launch, flight time, deployment, target acquisition and homing. This was quantified by physics and mathematics, no latitude for conjecture or doubt. One of the detailed analyses which we developed, required as a deliverable under contract, was a series of OSDs (Operational Sequence Diagrams) which defined in excruciating detail, own ship, quantified, sequential response through the total threat engagement in each threat scenario. I was personally intimately familiar with these OSDs, I had developed every one.     

At that juncture, I exacerbated their dilemma by asking them about how they planned on dealing with the Charlie Class SSG(N)/SS-N-7 challenge? Response; momentary shock and disbelief, then, and I will never forget it, HOW DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THAT!? Not even needing to rely on my naval intelligence background, I related that facts had been conveyed to the civilian ASW community in the NSIA briefings. Needless to say, two very chagrined LCDRs. Honestly I cannot recall how they reconciled the situation, in as much as I was as shocked and angry as they were. At that point in the program they would have had access to the basic intelligence, probably at a level of knowledge between what I then knew as an intelligence officer, and as a weapon systems engineer. I’m not certain what guidance they were ultimately able to obtain, nor at that level how prescient either officer was, but I’m certain all of us agreed the Navy needed a new class of destroyer.

Soviet Navy Charlie I Class SSGN

Soviet Navy SS-N-7 Starbright (Ametist/4K66) cruise missile

As the program progressed I became more and more frustrated with the fact that while as a basic weapons system platform the DD-963 was projected to be potentially a highly capable and versatile hull, its capability as an effectively armed combatant was in its initially specified configuration severely lacking.

Independent of either my position at Honeywell or as a naval intelligence officer, I drafted an article, entirely from unclassified open sources, comparing the projected Spruance Class destroyer to the then operationally deployed Soviet Navy Kynda (Project 58 - Ракетные крейсера проекта 58) Class and Kresta I (Project 1134 Berkut) Class guided missile cruisers. In essence the article conveyed that at both significantly lesser, as well as comparable displacements, the Kynda and Kresta I Classes, already at sea, were ton-for-ton (kilogram-for-kilogram) far more formidable warships.

USS Spruance Class (DD-963) original configuration

Soviet Navy Kynda Class CLG

Soviet Navy Kresta I Class CLG

I submitted the article (including a comparative drawing of the ships) to the US Naval Institute Proceedings for potential publication, with a copy to Honeywell management. It suffices that the reaction time of Honeywell was by far swifter, and more directed, than the Spruance could have ever mounted against a Soviet submarine. I was told, in no uncertain terms, that if I was to enjoy continuing employment, I should retract the article. Unfortunately, at that juncture a wife and three small children weighed heavily in the decision, and the article was withdrawn. What was to prove particularly bitter and galling was that within no more than a couple of months the Naval Institute published an article, authored by two active duty navy captains (possibly a career limiting action), which detailed the exact same sentiments. At least it got said. Once again another Don Quixote windmill. Fortuitously, albeit over an un-necessarily protracted period of time, with the integration of the Vertical Launch System, VLS Mk 41, the Spruance Class became a much more capable warship. Albeit two decades later. That was the second bitter pill this author had to swallow. Initial concept presentation to the Navy had been in 1963 (see original model of concept below). The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the VLS Mk 41 was in the USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), commissioned September 1986, 23 years later.

U.S. Navy Vertical Launch Missile System VLS Mk41 circa 1986

Concept model of single cell module
of VLS showing General Dynamics/Pomona
Standard Missile RIM-66 circa 1963  

Toy Soldiers, It's all in the Cards - Cigarette Cards that is

Encompassed within the broad yet still rather esoteric field of militaria, is the sub category of books and ephemera. The books include not just the obvious, critically important reference and identification documents, but such things as regimental/unit histories. Ephemera are such items as commissions, personal correspondence, operational orders, and after-action reports, to name just a few. It also includes, of all things, military subject oriented cigarette cards.

As some may already know, cigarette cards originated in the United States beginning in 1875, with the dual purpose of stiffening the packaging in order to provide protection from bending the cigarettes, and as a form of advertisement for a specific company’s product. The originating company was Allen & Ginter Tobacco Company, and another named Goodwin & Company, soon followed. This novel form of advertising very quickly spread across the Atlantic Ocean to Great Britain. Apparently as addictive as the product they contained, a company in England, by the name of W.D. & H.O. Wills incorporated the idea into their packages in 1887. Those readers who might be interested further in the history and development of the cigarette card in the United States may want to go to the following web site; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cigarette_card .

As a hobby in and of itself, the collecting of cigarette cards is known as Cartophily, obviously derived and akin to the hobby of philately, the collection of postage stamps. 

However, the principle intention of this article is to explore a parallel development in the United Kingdom, specifically all the card series which focused on a military theme. One of the first companies in the UK was W.D. & H.O. Wills in 1887 (or 1888), followed by John Player & Sons in 1893, and Thomas Ogden in 1894  It was in 1895 that the Wills company introduced a set titled Ships & Soldiers. Some of the earliest cards were printed on silk, then backed with paper. This practice was discontinued during World War II, apparently to save paper, and never reintroduced thereafter.  Production ceased with all companies during both World War I and II, with the government citing shortage of materials, as well as being a potential open source of intelligence to the enemy.

In addition to the ‘American Card Catalog’ (ACC) there is The World Tobacco Index (WTI) published by the Cartophilic Society of Great Britain (CSGB), using an alphanumeric index system based on manufacturer’s names. This will give the reader some indication as to how serious collectors are about their hobby in and of itself. As is the case with stamps, rarity, set completeness, and condition enter into their evaluation.

While Wills and other British tobacco companies published cards with military subjects, it was John Player & Sons that soon emerged with card sets which incorporated the most accurate research, colours, diversity of subjects, format, and quality of printing.

As Player continued to refine the research, diversity of military and naval subjects, and quality, of their cards, they rapidly gained the respect and desirability with collectors of militaria. It naturally follows they also gained a significance portion, if not the preponderance of the market, both for their cards, as well as their cigarettes.

There are a range of methods in which to display a set of cards. The company even published small blank collectors albums for each set, as well as an adhesive (to be moistened) on the back of each card. As the description of each card was printed on its back, a duplicate was printed on each page, adjacent to the space designated for the cards, in order that the information was not lost. Another popular means of display are specifically compartmented clear plastic three-ring binder page which shows both the front and back. A variant on clear plastic pages is a small clear acrylic storage box, sized precisely to accommodate up to one hundred cards. Still another method is matting in a frame with spaces dimensioned for each card in a set, with a pane of glass on both front and back. Obviously this is a quite expensive investment, given the current price of framing, and thus limited to a particularly unique, valuable, and attractive set of cards.

The following images show such a display format for a set of Wills cigarette cards depicting the ranks and uniforms of the Royal Navy from the turn of the Twentieth century in the author's private collection. The set published in 1909, is No. 50 titled Naval Dress and Badges. Author's apologies for the glare of the camera flash, it's slightly better, but segmented in the last two images. 

Some of the sets of cards have become reference standards for collectors, becoming a convenient source for the detailed correct colours, uniforms, badges, accoutrements, and armament for regiments of the British Army, Territorial Army, and units of the contemporary British Commonwealth. They provided the same range of accurate information for the ships and uniforms of the Royal Navy, aircraft and uniforms of the Royal Air Force, and historical uniforms as well. For those readers who may want to specifically determine the range of military oriented sets, as well as others, and a fairly recent evaluation (2003) of their value, please refer to; http://www.cigarettecards.co.uk/valueplayers.htm 

The following image depicts a complete set of John Player & Sons cards containing  all of the attributes discussed in the previous paragraph, are consequently very popular and sought after by collectors of toy soldiers and military miniatures. This set published in 1939 is No.50 titled Uniforms of the Territorial Army. Another set that is very popular shows an equal range of soldiers of the then contemporary British Commonwealth of nations.

Unfortunately following World War II, due to the combination of rationing and high cost of raw materials, cigarette cards never returned. Consequently much like the case of W. Britains Ltd. toy soldiers two decades later, becoming instant antiques, with a few exceptions. Black Cat and Carreras Cigarettes are known to have been producing cards into the 1970s (Wills until 1965).